

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 05969 01 OF 02 041724Z

43

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ERDE-00 MC-02 /085 W

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O R 041639Z OCT 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4391

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5969

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJ: MBFR: PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF OPTION III: SPC MEETING

NOV 3

REFS: A) USNATO 5666 171510Z OCT 75; B) USNATO 5743 221205Z OCT 75

SUMMARY: AT SPC MEETING NOV 3, UK AND DUTCH DELEGATIONS INTRODUCED AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT PAPER ON PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF OPTION III. UK AMENDMENT WOULD GIVE AHG ALONE THE JUDGMENT ON WHEN TO MAKE A PRESS STATEMENT, BUT WOULD REQUIRE AHG TO USE ONE, ALL PURPOSE TEXT. DUTCH AMENDMENT WOULD LIMIT INITIAL PRESS STATEMENT TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OFFER, AND WOULD PREVENT ALLIED SPOKESMEN FROM REASSURING PUBLIC THAT THE OFFER DID NOT JEOPARDIZE WESTERN SECURITY, EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS. UK AND DUTCH REPS STRESSED THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES RECOGNIZED THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO WORK OVER THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION PAPER AS THOROUGHLY AS THE GUIDANCE AND POSITION PAPER. ACTION

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05969 01 OF 02 041724Z

REQUEST: SEE PARA 8 BELOW. END SUMMARY

1. THE DRAFT PAPER ON PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF OPTION III PRESENTLY CONSISTS IN THE TEXT IN REF A, WITH THE AMENDMENTS IN

PARAS 13 A AND B, REF B.

2. AT NOV 3 SPC MEETING, UK REP (BAILES) INTRODUCED THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENTS TO THIS PAPER:

BEGIN TEXT OF UK AMENDMENTS:

A. ADD AT END OF EXISTING PARA. 1 THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE FROM PARA 5: "THEREFORE THE ALLIES DO NOT NOW DESIRE TO ENTER INTO A PUBLICITY DEBATE WITH THE EAST ON MBFR PROPOSALS OR PRESENT A NATO WHITE PAPER ON THE ALLIED POSITION, PARTICULARLY THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE".

B. DELETE EXISTING PARA 5 AND INSERT NEW PARAS 5 AND 6 AS FOLLOWS:

"5. THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF PRESS INTEREST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE VIENNA AS IT HAS BEEN HERETOFORE. IN THE EVENT OF A LEAK TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ALLIES HAVE MADE A NUCLEAR INITIATIVE THE AD HOC GROUP WILL NEED TO

CONSIDER WHETHER THE RISK THAT DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESS COULD PREJUDICE A CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE OUTWEIGHS THE RISK THAT THE ALLIED INITIATIVE WILL BE MISREPRESENTED OR GO BY DEFAULT IN THE ABSENCE OF OFFICIAL COMMENT. WHEN IN THEIR JUDGEMENT THE TIMING IS CORRECT AND THERE IS A NEED TO COMMENT THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD ISSUE IN FULL THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT IN SECTION II BELOW. IF THE AD HOC GROUP IS NOT IN SESSION THE COUNCIL WILL MAKE THIS JUDGEMENT WITH ALL POSSIBLE SPEED AND WILL, WHEN APPROPRIATE, ISSUE THE STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE ALLIES.

6. UNTIL THE STATEMENT IN SECTION II BELOW HAS BEEN ISSUED ALLIED PRESS SPOKESMEN SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE. AFTER THE STATEMENT HAS BEEN ISSUED ALLIED PRESS SPOKESMEN IN CAPITALS MAY BE AUTHORIZED

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05969 01 OF 02 041724Z

TO DRAW AT THEIR DISCRETION ON THE MATERIAL IN SECTION III BELOW IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS. IN MAKING USE OF THIS MATERIAL ALLIED PRESS SPOKESMEN SHOULD REASSURE WESTERN PUBLICS THAT THE NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE WESTERN SECURITY IF, REPEAT IF, TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN REDUCTIONS THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED. HOWEVER, IN MAKING SUCH REASSURANCES WESTERN PRESS SPOKESMEN SHOULD NOT DEPRECATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS."

MBFR: PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVE EXAMPLE OF A CONTINGENCY PRESS STATEMENT

(OF. SPC(OT)N/6, II(C), (D), (E), (A), (G), (I))

AFTER EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REUCTIONS, THE ALLIES HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE A MAJOR NEW INITIATIVE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT. THIS PROPOSAL INVOLVES THE WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS FROM EUROPE, INCLUDING SOME US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, SOME US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT, AND SOME US SURFACE-TO-SURFACE PERSHING MISSILE LAUNCHERS. IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING TO BE REACHED IN PHASE II BE EXTENDED TO COVER AIR AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

THIS INITIATIVE IS A ONE-TIME OFFER AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A STEP TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT. TAKEN TOGETHER WITH PREVIOUS ALLIED PROPOSALS, IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT EASTERN CONCEFNS THAT AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 05969 02 OF 02 041750Z

43
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 5969

IN VIEW OF THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF THESE US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, THE ALLIED OFFER IS A WEIGHTY ONE. THE ALLIES ARE CONFIDENT THAT ITS SIGNIFICANCE WILL NOT BE OVERLOOKED BY THE EAST IF THE EAST IS TRULY INTERESTED IN PURSUING PRACTICAL MEASURES OF DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD IN EUROPE AND IS INTERESTED IN REACHING A SUBSTANTIAL AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND REDUCE

THE RISKS OF WAR IN EUROPE.

THE PRIMARY ALLIED OBJECTIVE AS TO THE OUTCOME OF MBFR
CONTINUES TO BE THE REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITIES
IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS IN ENTRAL EUROPE THROUGH
THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND AGREEMENT IN PHASE
I TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON
THE GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES. THIS DISPARITY
IN GROUND FORCES IS THE MOST DESTABLISING FEATURE OF THE
MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE; ITS REDUCTION WOULD LESSEN
THE RISK OF WAR, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WAR, IN DUROPE.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05969 02 OF 02 041750Z

IF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF US GROUND FORCES AND
NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TAKE PLACE, NATO WOULD RETAIN ADEQUATE
MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER WAR IN EUROPE THROUGH THE AGREED
NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THIS STRATEGY WILL CONTINUE
TO BE THE BASIS OF ALLIED DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS IN WESTERN
EUROPE.

THE ALLIES EXPECT THE EAST TO MAKE A POSITIVE RESPONSE
TO THIS IMPORTANT INITIATIVE AND TO AGREE TO ADDRESS ALLIED.
CONCERNS ABOUT THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.
END TEXT OF UK AMENDMENTS

3. NETHERLANDS REP (MEESMAN) INTRODUCED A RE-ARRANGEMENT OF
THE DRAFT PAPER ON PUBLIC PRESENTATION AS FOLLOWS.
THE PAPER WOULD BE UNCHANGED THROUGH THE FIRST SENTENCE
OF PARA 3. THE REMAINDER OF PARA 3 AND PARA 4 WOULD BE DELETED.
PARA 5 WOULD BE UNCHANGED, EXCEPT FOR THE DELETION OF THE FINAL
TWO SENTENCES ON REASSURING WESTERN PUBLIC THAT NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS
WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE WESTERN SECURITY. SECTION II OF THE PAPER,
ON ELEMENTS OF A PRESS STATEMENT WOULD CONSIST IN THE PRESENT
SUB-PARAS A-E, AND I. THIS IS IN LINE WITH DUTCH DESIRE
THAT ANY INITIAL PRESS STATEMENT PUT THE EMPHASIS ON THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE OFFER, AND NOT ON THE FACT THAT THE OFFER
WOULD NOT DIMINISH ALLIED SECURITY. SECTION III (CONTINGENCY
ARGUMENTS) HAS THE SAME LEAD-IN AS THE PRESENT SECTION III,
EXCEPT THAT AFTER THE FIRST SENTENCE APPEARS THE FOLLOWING
RE-WORKED VERSION OF THE SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCES OF PARA 3,
SECTION I: "IF QUESTIONS ARE RAISED IN THE PRESS AND IN THE
MINDS OF THE PUBLIC OVER THE IMPLICATION FOR ALLIED SECURITY
OF THE NUCLEAR PROPOSAL, THEY SHOULD TRY TO DEAL WITH THESE
CONCERNS IN A POSITIVE WAY. HOWEVER, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE,
ANY RESPONSE SHOULD BE LOW-KEY IN NATURE, SO AS TO AVOID

EXTENSIVE PUBLIC COMMENT OR DEBATE." THE CONTINGENCY POINTS
ARE THEN AS CONTAINED IN REF A, WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS.
REPLACE POINT D BY SUB-PARAS F AND G OF SECTION II OF
TEXT IN REF A PLUS THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: "FURTHERMORE, EUROPEAN
PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR DEFENSE WILL NOT BE CHANGED."

4. BOTH UK AND NETHERLANDS REPS STRESSED THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05969 02 OF 02 041750Z

RECOGNIZED THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO WORK OVER THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION PAPER AS THOROUGHLY AS THE GUIDANCE AND POSITION PAPER, AND THIS IS WHY THEY ATTEMPTED MAINLY TO EFFECT THE CHANGES THEY WISHED BY RE-ORDERING THE PARAGRAPHS IN REF A.

5. SPC WILL RETURN TO THIS PAPER ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 6.

6. COMMENT: THE UK APPROACH WOULD LEAVE THE DECISION ON TIMING OF A PRESS STATEMENT TO THE AHG, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO FRG-US BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON A NAC ROLE AS WELL. THE UK PRESS STATEMENT IS A COMPLETE TEXT, RATHER THAN ELEMENTS, AND THE AHG WOULD HAVE TO USE IT IN FULL. THE DUTCH APPROACH WOULD PREVENT ALLIED SPOKESMEN FROM RE-ASSURING WESTERN PUBLIC THAT NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE WESTERN SECURITY, EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS. NONE OF THESE PRINCIPAL CHANGES APPEAR DESIRABLE TO US, AND WE BELIEVE THEY WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED DESIRABLE BY FRG, ALTHOUGH FINAL DUTCH SENTENCE IN PARA 3 ABOVE WOULD APPEAR ACCEPTABLE. WE SHALL WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH FRG DELEGATION ON THESE CHANGES, SINCE THE PUBLLC PRESENTATION PAPER REPRESENTS LARGE DEGREE OF US/FRG CONSENSUS.

7. UK HAS STATED AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS ITS CONCERN THAT THE EAST MIGHT LEAK SOMETHING ON OPTION III ON VERY SHORT NOTICE, E.G. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE, AND THAT AHG SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO REACT VERY RAPIDLY. UK MAY HAVE A POINT, BUT THE AHG RAPID REACTION NEED NOT BE THE COMPLETE TEXT OF A PARESS STATEMENT PROPOSED BY UK IN PARA 2 ABOVE. WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO CONSIDER THE DESIRABILITY OF A VERY BRIEF STATEMENT WHICH AHG WOULD HAVE READY (ASSUMING FRG COULD AGREE WITH SUCH AN APPROACH), WITH A MORE DETAILED STATEMENT TO BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE SET FORTH IN PARA 5, REF A. END COMMENT

8. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENT ON UK AND DUTCH PROPOSALS IN TIME FOR SPC MEETING THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 6.

STREATROR

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